Analysis: three scenarios of Moscow’s policy towards Transnistria

05.02.2015

The crisis in Russia’s foreign policy and economy triggered by Moscow’s activity in Ukraine speeded up the process of resolving the situation in the breakaway Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic.

Moscow has slashed Transnistria’s volume of financing. Financial injections into Abkhazia and South Ossetia have been adjusted as well, but they turned out to be less sensitive. The Social Payments and Benefits Fund in the PMR basically used Russian funds, as nearly all types of the benefits have been preserved in the PMR since Soviet times. Subsequently, the budget of the breakaway state is carrying a substantial social load.

The PMR is a breakaway state, so its economic agents operating through Russia’s jurisdiction have come under the sanctions imposed on Russia. As the result, Tiraspol is losing marketing outlets and desperately needs investment more and more. Aside from that, Ukraine and Chisinau are toughening the customs regulations for the breakaway state.

After monitoring the situation in the PMR in January, 2015, it is possible to note certain escalation in the statements between Moscow and Tiraspol. For example, Yevgeny Shevchuk, while interviewed by Radio 1, the «state» broadcasting station, said that it was not so profitable for the PMR to trade with Russia over the sanctions’ pressure. This interview was evidently bearing the marks of chiding Kremlin for the growth of Tiraspol’s losses and hinted at the need to increase the funding on the part of Russia. Concurrently, Moscow slammed Shevchuk for using a charter flight to visit Moscow. According to the information available, Moscow has no single vision and strategy towards the PMR. At the same time, Tiraspol has not got any action-oriented proposals, except for the budget requests, as well. Such kind of situation reminds Kremlin that Shevchuk was not Russia’s key stake during the Presidential elections in the PMR.

Coming to self-sufficiency scenario. Moscow understands that the Transnistrian economic system is a «black hole» in fact. The administrative model of economy, its high shadow level, non-transparency of the economic relations and the fact that this state formation is unrecognized affecting its export capacity sideline its self-sufficiency.

On January, 31, 2015, the majority share holding of the Moldavian iron and steel plant in Rybnitsa was transferred to the PMR authorities. The deal became a unique one as the reverse process had been observed in the Transnistrian region beforehand: the state-owned property had been transferred to the private economic agents. Trade details, including the value of the shares were not reported. But it is known that Tiraspol received the industry share held by the Russian businessman Alisher Usmanov.

Tiraspol leader Yevgeny Shevchuk claimed to do all possible so that the plant kept operating as usual and all the staff stayed. According to the estimations, more than 2500 people are working at the plant, thus making it one of the key sources of Transnistria’s budget funds flow.

95% of the plant’s output is exported to the EU countries among others. According to our estimations, the I&SP deal is nothing else but an attempt to provide the opportunity for Tiraspol to build up its own economic model, increase economy’s transparency, thus reducing the grant volumes on the part of the RF, preserving both the PMR and Russia’s military forces group under control.

We are of opinion that even taking into account the opportunities of official Tiraspol in increasing the plant’s competitive performance by virtue of the privileged gas prices, the authorities will not succeed in providing normal and effective operation of the I&SP in the mid-run. That’s why this case scenario is unlikely to dominate.

Infiltration scenario. The analysis proves that, generally, Moscow is likely to go the length of «yielding-up» the PMR in case the situation around the RF is deteriorating. But this operation will be carried out on condition of full autonomy, preserving the PMR leadership, as a subject forming part of Moldova. In particular, Grigory Karasin, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia, claimed that «Transnistria could have been a special area forming part of Moldova». Previously, the Foreign Minister of Russia Sergey Lavrov, on the contrary, took up the position that Russia could recognize Transnistria’s independence. That speaks for preserving the opportunity for Kremlin’s various final stands on the issue of Transnistria.

The attempt to infiltrate the PMR in its current state into Moldova’s governmental system could break all Moldova’s EU integration strategy. If this scenario is implemented, additional 0,4 million of the PMR citizens will be integrated into Moldova’s election system, totaling nearly 2,7 million people. Consequently, the PMR voters will account for 12,9% out of all the voters in Moldova. That will provide an opportunity to tilt Moldova’s electoral field in favor of the pro-Russian forces and more likely form the pro-Russian government in Chisinau, thus blocking the Euro integration process and speedy Moldova’s rapprochement with Romania. We are of opinion that the «Trojan Horse» scenario is strongly possible in the mid-run.

Unrest scenario. Amid growing external pressure, Moscow could consider the scenario of destabilizing the situation in the PMR and returning the frozen conflict to the active phase. That could be attained through engineering a social and economic crisis in Tiraspol alongside with concurrent mock military invasion into the PMR territory. Taking into account Russia’s media domination in the PMR, the economic crisis is likely to be reported as a result of Kyiv’s and Chisinau’s unfriendly policy, followed up by the mock invasion of the RF troops, accounting for nearly 1000 people in Transnistria.

Recently, the number of forecasts on Ukraine’s possible military invasion into the PMR has ramped up in the Russian media. Non-Presidential and non-governmental forces in Ukraine itself are developing the similar messages. According to our estimations, at the present time, there are evidences of Russia’s shaping the media scene for stirring up the conflict that will cover the territory of Transnistria and Gagauzia. This scenario will enable Moscow to open the «second frontline» in close proximity to the EU border, embroil Ukraine in it, having drawn the forces and facilities from the eastern territories, bring down Kyiv authorities in the face of the international community, as well as to distract Europe and the U.S. from the situation in Donetsk and Lugansk Oblasts by forcing to make quick peace under Kremlin’s terms and conditions. Moreover, that will enable Moscow to come to the escalation in the South of Odessa Oblast, gain an opportunity to «fight» for Odessa and further make a major thrust at Crimea. Shevchuk has repeatedly focused on the desirability of the common border with the RF territory in his statements.

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